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Abstract: We analyzed the impact of demographic, socioeconomic and Certificate of Need 
(CON) regulation variables on the supply of nursing home and hospital beds across the nation 
and specifically in the Eugene-Springfield area.  Our results indicate that CON regulation restrict 
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found that Eugene-Springfield currently has an insufficient supply of nursing home and hospital 
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1. Introduction 
 As the U.S. population is projected to grow by 48% from 2000 to 2050, it is imperative 
that the supply of health care maintains pace with the increased demand.  Nursing homes and 
hospitals are two primary means of health care that will be impacted by this growth.  
Maintaining an adequate supply of beds for both is particularly important due to the rapidly 
growing elderly population.  In 2003, 12.4% of the American population was sixty-five years 
and older; this number is projected to increase to 20.7% by 2050. 1  The elderly portion of 
America is increasing both relative to other age segments and in longevity; in 2003, the average 
expected additional lifespan of a person sixty-five years old is 18.5 years.2  The combination of a 
growing general and elderly population, and increased longevity of the elderly will increase 
demand for nursing home and hospital beds.  Therefore, it is essential to estimate the needed 
supply of nursing home and hospital beds in a given locale.   
 The current hospital situation in the Eugene-Springfield area highlights the necessity of 
estimating the needed capacity of beds.  The two hospitals that serve the Eugene-Springfield area 
are Sacred Heart and McKenzie-Willamette.  Sacred Heart, a non-profit owned by PeaceHealth 
and located in Eugene, is the largest with 438 beds.  McKenzie-Willamette, a for-profit owned 
by Triad Inc. and located in Springfield, has 105 beds.  In the past year, PeaceHealth has moved 
forward with its plans to establish a new 362-bed, $350 million medical center located along the 
McKenzie river in north Springfield.  Triad, concerned about increased competition in 
Springfield, decided to relocate to north Eugene.  However, PeaceHealth also decided to remodel 
its existing Hilyard campus facility near downtown Eugene into a 104-bed hospital that will 
                                                   
1 http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/usinterimproj/natprojtab02a.pdf 
2 http://www.aoa.gov/PRESS/fact/pdf/Attachment_1304.pdf 
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house an inpatient psychiatric unit, inpatient rehabilitation unit, a geriatrics unit and a 24-hour 
emergency department.3  
In a free market, the supply and demand for nursing home and hospital beds would 
fluctuate until reaching equilibrium.  In the majority of states, however, the market is regulated 
by Certificate of Need (CON) regulations.  The purpose of a CON regulation is to control 
hospital and other health care costs by preventing unnecessary construction of new hospital or 
other institutional beds and preventing the unnecessary duplication of services.  Oregon has had 
CON regulations for hospitals since 1971 and for nursing homes since 1973. 
 In February 2006, the Oregon Department of Health Services granted a Certificate of 
Need for the 104 beds at the Hilyard campus.  Also in February, Triad submitted an application 
for its 148-bed, $225 million hospital in Eugene.4  There has been significant debate within the 
community over whether the Eugene-Springfield area needs this many additional beds.   
 The need to estimate needed capacity is apparent.  We will build two models that analyze 
the needed capacity of nursing home and hospital beds.  By using national data, we can control 
for the influence of demographic and socioeconomic trends and CON regulations.  We will use 
our models to estimate the needed capacity of beds in the Eugene-Springfield area. 
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  The next section is a review of literature.  The 
following sections discuss our methodology and hypotheses and how the data is collected.  The 
remaining sections estimate our regression models and then use the results to estimate needed 
capacity in the Eugene-Springfield area.  We conclude by comparing estimated needed capacity 
with current capacity. 
 
 
3 All statistics concerning Eugene-Springfield situation may be found online at http://www.registerguard.com/ 
4 http://www.oregon.gov/DHS/news/
 
 M. Stratman and M. Spellman || Department of Economics, University of Oregon (2006)  Page 3 
 
2. Literature Review 
 There is extensive literature studying factors of nursing home and hospital bed capacity 
and the impact of CON regulations on the health care industry. 
2.1. Nursing Homes 
 The literature on nursing homes ranges from analyzing factors of demand for nursing 
home care at the individual level to substitutes of nursing homes to the interaction between 
market concentration, quality and cost of nursing homes. 
Garber and MaCurdy (1989) study a targeted group of low-income elderly Americans 
who have high-risk health characteristics and analyze what factors contribute to the likelihood of 
admission and duration of admission.  They emphasize three main categories of characteristics 
that are important determinants of institutionalization.  The first factor is demographics; nearly 
every study that controls for age has found that aging is associated with an increased risk of 
institutionalization.   
The second factor is health and functional status.  Two main measures of functional 
status are Activities of Daily Living and Instrumental Activities of Daily Living which measure 
the ability to perform basic functions (like dressing and eating) and more complex tasks (like 
shopping and handling finances).  The third factor is financial status.  Based on past findings 
where being poor led to higher rates of institutionalization, they speculate this may be explained 
by increased utilization of home health services by wealthier people.   
In their study, Garber and MaCurdy include the following variables:  demographics, 
health and functional status, social supports (marital status and number of living children), 
Medicaid and supplemental insurance, home ownership and educational attainment.  Using 
individual level data, they find the following variables decrease the likelihood of admission to 
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nursing homes: home ownership, having living children and being non-white.  The following 
variables are found to increase the likelihood of admission: Medicaid participation, advanced 
age, functional impairments and dementia.  Income is not a significant factor.  Advanced 
education is associated with increased duration of institutionalization. 
Lakadawalla and Philipson (1999) analyze how the supply of long-term care responds to 
an aging population.  They argue that aging may decrease per capita demand for long-term care 
because the supply of family-provided care (a substitute) may increase.  They also examine the 
impact of marital status on the probability of institutionalization.  They show the supply of 
nursing home beds contracts with the longevity of the scarcer gender, typically males, and 
expands with the healthy life-expectancies of the abundant gender, typically females.  In general, 
the female is able to care for her husband in his old age and home-based care is substituted for 
market-based nursing home care.  By the time females need living assistance, they tend to be 
widowed and need to seek market-based care.  Growth in elderly males reduces the per capita 
demand for market care while growth in elderly females raises per capita demand.  Using 
microdata, they find the presence of a spouse more than halves the probability of 
institutionalization.  They also point out that increases in the relative health of elderly have 
helped slow the rate of growth of long-term care. 
Some studies focus on the demand and supply of nursing home care; others analyze the 
interaction of market concentration, efficiency and quality.  Zhou and Suzuki (2005) investigate 
whether care providers in highly competitive markets have a higher level of quality and 
efficiency than those in highly concentrated markets.  Previous research has conflicting 
conclusions.  Some studies show that hospitals tend to compete on non-price assets.  
Consequently, hospitals provide too many high-technology services and hire excess staff which 
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raises patient costs.  Other studies suggest that competition leads to substantially lower costs.  
From their model on the Japanese home care industry, the authors find that competition is 
associated with lower costs.  In another study, Gertler and Waldman (1992) find that increases in 
competition are associated with higher levels of both quality and cost. 
2.2. Hospitals 
The importance of examining the healthcare marketplace can be seen through its frequent 
appearance in legislative and policy debates.  Furthermore, we need to recognize the strength of 
the preferences individuals have for cost effective, high quality and easily accessible health care.  
There has been a high level of theoretical interest surrounding the issue of hospital capacity and 
utilization, but many studies were conducted prior to the 1986 abolishment of mandatory CON 
regulations and neglect recent developments that have occurred in the legislation of the law.  The 
implications of CON regulations on the number of hospital beds are now more relevant to 
examine as we can compare areas that have CON laws versus those that provide healthcare in a 
competitive market.  Nevertheless, the older studies still serve an important role in our study as 
they suggest factors that influence the market for an area’s need for hospital beds.  
A study by Joskow (1980) determines what factors affect a hospital’s supply decisions 
and classifies them as being the fundamentals of a hospital’s constraint function.  Joskow argues 
that three characteristics of the market constrain the ability of a hospital to maximize its 
objective function.  First, a hospital must at least break even, where revenues earned are 
sufficient to cover costs.  Second, the constraint can be determined by the demand for health care 
services.  To capture aggregate community demand, Joskow suggests various demographic 
factors: population, the extent of insurance coverage of the population and birth and death rates.  
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Last, Joskow reiterates that hospital behavior may be constrained by government regulation.  
This will be examined explicitly in our statistical analysis below.  
 There are also papers that analyze the “appropriate” role of competition in health care 
markets, a topic that has been debated by federal and state legislators, judges and academia for 
years.  In a report by the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice (2004), they 
argue that the structure of the extensive regulation of the health care market at federal and state 
levels has significantly altered competition unnecessarily.  The authors state that the 
“government’s actions as both a both purchaser and regulator have profound effects on the rest 
of the health care financing and delivery markets as well” and that “price regulation, even if 
indirect, can distort provider responses to consumer demand and restrict consumer access to 
health care services” (FTC 2004).  
The paper also examines the current operation of the health care market, with specific 
focus on consumers and their methods of obtaining health insurance, including publicly funded 
programs (Medicare and Medicaid), employer-provided and individual.  In their analysis of the 
competitive responses of hospitals, the authors contend that while some hospitals attempt to find 
ways to decrease costs, improve quality and compete more efficiently, others often exercise 
market power to demand price increases from consumers and seek to prevent entry of new 
competing hospitals (FTC 2004).  This is consistent with the argument that is currently being 
made by Triad in the Eugene-Springfield area concerning PeaceHealth’s recent operations of 
expansion and relocation. Ed Whitelaw, principal with the consulting group ECONorthwest, 
states that “market concentration by one entity increases the bargaining power of the hospital in 
its negotiations with insurance providers, which can result in higher fees for hospital services.  
[With PeaceHealth’s expansion] Lane County can expect more market concentration, less 
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competition and higher prices.”5  The authors recognize that if prices were to increase, the 
hospital would argue that rather than contributing to the rise in increased market power, it is 
instead a result of pressures such as shortages of nurses and other personnel, rising liability 
premiums, the costs of improved technology and the obligations of indigent care (FTC 2004).  
The paper recognizes that some studies find the relationship between competition and hospital 
prices is that high hospital concentration is coupled with increased prices, regardless whether the 
hospitals are for-profit or non-profit (FTC 2004).   
2.3. Certificate of Need 
 As mentioned previously, CON regulation attempts to control costs and prevent 
unnecessary duplication of health care.  There is ongoing debate about the impact of CON 
regulation and whether it is beneficial or detrimental to the health care industry.  As this paper 
seeks to determine how CON influences needed capacity, it is important to understand the 
history and discussion of CON regulation. 
 As of June 30, 2004, 37 states and the District of Columbia have active CON laws that 
regulate the supply of healthcare facilities in a designated area (Chung 2005).  Proponents of 
CON argue that by controlling costs in the health sector, CON regulations can improve and/or 
protect the quality of care and access to needed services for the majority of the population.  
Opponents of the CON process contend that such constraints can pose serious “competitive 
concerns that generally outweigh CON programs’” alleged economic benefits (FTC 2004).  They 
argue that this determent from a competitive market can result in reduced access, higher prices, 
decreased quality of care and serve primarily to protect existing providers.  In states with CON 
laws, the methodology for determining nursing home bed need is generally based on a state’s bed 
to population ratio.  In Tennessee, for example, Senate Bill No. 2463, passed during the 1998 
 
5http://www.registerguard.com/ 
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legislative session, establishes a bed need formula that the State’s Health Facilities Commission 
must follow when granting CON for nursing home beds in the state. The formula6, given below, 
is for “county-bed need” and uses a population-based statistical methodology:  
bed need = (0.0005 * pop 65 and under) + (0.0120 * pop 65-74) + (0.0600 * pop 75-84) + (0.1500 * pop 85+) 
In addition, age specific consumption rates, a desired occupancy rate and future 
population growth are often taken into account (Weiner 1998).  Some state’s governing agencies 
do not use any mathematical formula to determine how many beds should be in an area.  Instead, 
they base their decisions on general criteria that usually involve various demographic and 
economic factors.   
Congress passed the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 
to require states to implement the CON law.  These federal requirements for health planning and 
CON were removed in 1986, but as stated above, as of June 30, 2004, 37 states (including the 
District of Columbia) continue their CON programs for nursing facilities (Chung 2005). 
Whether CON regulations are currently implemented in a state or not, within individual 
states there is active debate about whether CON should be maintained, removed, or, in the case of 
states that have eliminated CON, reapplied.  During 2002, state legislatures discussed more than 
30 proposals related to CON.7
  Oregon’s CON process has been in operation since 1971 and nursing facilities have been 
covered under the program since 1973.  The Oregon CON program’s strategies are defined as:  
(a) Promoting development of more effective methods of delivering health care;  
(b) Improving distribution of health care facilities and services;  
 
6 http://www2.state.tn.us/health/statistics/ 
7 http://jama.ama-assn.org/
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(c) Controlling increase of health care costs, including the promotion of improved 
competition between providers;  
(d) Promoting planning for health care services at the facility, regional and state levels;  
(e) Maximizing the use of existing health care facilities and services which represent the 
least costly and most appropriate levels of care; and  
(f) Minimizing the unnecessary duplication of health care facilities and services.8 
 According to Statute 442.315, Oregon CON laws state that any new hospital or new 
skilled nursing or intermediate care service or facility that is attempting to move outside of its 
current service area shall obtain a CON from the Department of Human Services prior to 
development.  After a formal application is submitted by the facility, the Department of Human 
Services Health Division sets rules specifying criteria and procedures, using the aforementioned 
strategies as a guideline, for making decisions on the need for the new services or facilities and is 
the decision-making authority.9  
The effect that state CON regulations have on the economics of health care markets is 
analyzed in a variety of literature.  Previous studies examine the impact CON regulation on a 
state’s health care supply.  Most focus on the implications on the state’s health care spending. 
Conover and Sloan (1998) examine the impact of CON regulation for hospitals on measures of 
health spending per capita and hospital supply.  Using time series cross-sectional methodology, 
they estimate the net impact of CON policies.  They find that mature CON programs are 
associated with a modest long-term reduction in total per capita spending along with a slight 
 
8 http://www.oregon.gov/DHS/
9 http://www.oregon.gov/DHS/
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(2%) reduction in bed supply, but higher costs per day and per admission.  They find no evidence 
of a surge in acquisition of facilities or in costs following removal of a state’s CON regulations.  
A study by Harrington, Swan, Nyman, and Camillo (1997) examine the effects of state 
CON requirements on the change in nursing home bed growth over a 13 year period between 
1979 and 1993.  Running a two-stage least squares regression analysis using data primarily from 
surveys of state officials concerning their state’s policies, while treating CON as an endogenous 
variable, they predict the change in nursing home beds per aged population in the states.  The 
study finds that states with CON regulations do have significant reductions in the growth in 
nursing home beds.   
Joskow’s results, based on an analysis that occurred when every state was required to 
implement CON laws, indicate that CON regulation and other efforts to restrict hospital capacity 
have a significant impact on hospital bed supply decisions.  One goal of this paper is to 
reexamine these results by analyzing the health care industry using updated market information, 
improved data accessibility and the state-to-state variation of CON regulation that allows states 
to determine whether they should enact a regulation or let the hospitals participate in a 
competitive market.      
 Because of the ambiguity of operating with or without CON regulations in the health care 
market, this study will evaluate the influence of CON regulation on the supply of nursing home 
and hospital beds in an area by comparing it to an area with the same characteristics but without 
CON.  Specifically, we recognize the 14 states not currently under CON regulations as our 
control group and the metropolitan statistical areas within them as the areas where market forces 
determine the number of health care facilities and beds.   
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3. Methodology and Hypothesis 
3.1. Nursing Home Bed Hypotheses 
For the nursing home regressions, our dependent variable is the number of nursing home 
beds in each Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).  Our regressions intend to determine which 
variables significantly impact the number of nursing home beds in a MSA and to estimate the 
number of beds needed in the area.  From our regressions, we will be able to determine whether 
Eugene-Springfield is at, exceeding or below capacity relative to other communities with the 
same characteristics.   
 We choose our explanatory variables based on previous research.  Our first explanatory 
variable is the total population (male and female) 65 years and older measured in thousands of 
persons.  We hypothesize that the coefficient on this variable will be positive, indicating that the 
demand for nursing home beds will increase as the number of persons increases. 
 Our second explanatory variable is males 65 years and older, measured in thousands.  We 
hypothesize this variable will be negative.  Past literature has shown that as the share of males 65 
years and older increases, demand for nursing home beds decreases, all else constant.  It is 
common for the wife to provide in-home support for her aging husband which decreases his 
demand for nursing home care.  However, the female tend to be widowed and living alone by the 
time she needs assistance.  Consequently, she has a higher probability of entering a nursing home 
to attain this help.  Since male longevity has increased over the past several decades, this trend 
may be lessening. 
Our third variable is whether the MSA is in a state that has a Certificate of Need (CON) 
law.  As explained earlier, the majority of states have CON regulations which attempt to regulate 
the supply and costs of nursing home beds.  Due to this governmental intervention, CON 
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regulations create a market distortion in the nursing home industry.  We hypothesize that the 
coefficient on the CON regulation variable will be negative; that is, the presence of CON 
regulations constricts nursing home bed capacity.  We use a dummy variable to capture the effect 
of CON regulations (if present in the year 2004), where 1 denotes presence of CON regulation 
and 0 denotes no CON regulation.  Since CON regulations vary by state and some MSAs cross 
state boundaries, we assigned the dummy variable according to the state that contains the largest 
number of nursing home beds in that MSA.  For example, MSA 2240 includes cities in both 
Minnesota and Wisconsin.  Minnesota does not have a CON law while Wisconsin does.  Since 
more nursing home beds are in Minnesota, the CON law dummy variable is 0.  See Appendix A 
for a list of all applicable MSAs and their assigned dummy variable. 
Our fourth variable is the number of persons 65 and older that are below the poverty 
level, measured in thousands of persons.  We hypothesize that the coefficient on this variable 
will be negative, although we also see arguments indicating a positive coefficient.  Intuition 
suggests that persons living below the poverty level are unable to afford nursing home care; 
consequently, the more people living below the poverty level, the fewer nursing home beds are 
needed.  However, Medicaid does cover nursing home expenses for persons who meet the state-
determined poverty level and certain health-related criteria.10  This suggests a positive 
correlation between number of persons living below the poverty level and number of beds.  
Qualifying for Medicaid is a stringent and complex process and relatively few elderly are on 
Medicaid.  In addition, qualifications vary greatly by state.11  Knowing this, we argue that while 
Medicaid may increase nursing home admission, there are not enough elderly on Medicaid to 
capture this.  Another argument for a positive relationship between poverty level and beds are 
 
10 http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/personal-finance/longterm-care-insurance-1103/what-medicaremedicaid-
cover/index.htm 
11 http://www.kff.org/medicaid/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=14325 
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others studies find that higher levels of income lead to lower rates of nursing home admission.  
The primary explanation is that the elderly with higher levels of income are more likely to hire 
in-home assistance because it is preferred over nursing home care.12   
Our fifth variable is presence of functional disability.  Most studies include Activities of 
Daily Living and Instrumental Activities of Daily Living data to control for functional 
impairments.  As these data are unavailable by MSA, we instead used data from the Census 
Bureau for people 65 years and older who have a self-care disability or a go-outside-of-home 
disability, measured in thousands.  We hypothesize that the coefficient on this variable will be 
positive.  That is, as the number of people with functional impairments increase, the demand for 
nursing home beds will also increase.   
Our final variable is educational attainment.  Some literature has indicated an impact of 
education level on nursing home demand.  For our regression, we use data for people 65 years 
and older who have some college or higher, measured in thousands.  We hypothesize that the 
coefficient on this variable will be positive.  The relationship between health and education is 
ambiguous; economists have not yet determined which factor has the greatest impact on the 
other, or the interplay between the variables.  However, we hypothesize that a higher level of 
education correlates with a longer lifespan and, thus, an increased likelihood of nursing home 
admission. 
See Table 1 for a summary of the descriptive statistics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 Garber and MaCurdy (1989) 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Nursing Home Variables 
Variables Number of Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Dependent Variable 
     Nursing home beds 320 3688.688 6073.136 222 54401 
Regressors (in 1,000s) 
     Total population 65+ 320 81.761 129.693 7.662 1109.821 
     Total males 65+ 320 33.443 52.288 3.310 429.536 
     Below poverty level 65+ 320 7.109 13.867 0.297 172.583 
     Disability 65+ 320 23.305 40.170 1.605 396.666 
     Some college 65+ 320 29.129 47.123 2.1 375.003 
 
3.2. Hospital Bed Hypotheses 
Our models in this study focus on nursing home bed capacity and hospital bed capacity.  
These regressions share similar characteristics, such as demographics and the impact of CON 
regulation, but have important differences. 
For this model, the dependent variable, similar to the nursing home model, is the total 
number of staffed hospital beds in a MSA. Several explanatory variables should help determine 
needed capacity of staffed hospital beds in a MSA.  The first factor is total population, measured 
in thousands of persons.  We hypothesize that the coefficient on this variable will be positive, 
indicating that the demand for hospital beds will increase as the number of persons increases.  
Based on intuition and literature, our second hypothesized variable is the total population 
of persons 65 and older.  As in our nursing home bed model, we hypothesize that the sign on the 
coefficient should be positive; the higher the population of persons more susceptible to health 
complications due to old age, the higher number of needed hospital beds. 
The third variable is the total population of childbearing age females.  We define 
childbearing age as 15 to 44 years old.  We hypothesize that the coefficient on this variable is 
positive: the greater the number of women of childbearing age, the greater the number of hospital 
beds needed for childbirth.   
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The fourth variable is insurance coverage.  We hypothesize that the coefficient on this 
variable is positive: the greater degree of health care coverage, the greater the accessibility of 
health care and, therefore, the greater the propensity to use it.  The data is gathered at the state 
level and captures the number of persons that are covered through employer-provided, 
individual, Medicaid, Medicare or other public health insurance plans.   
Our final variable is the presence of CON regulations.  We hypothesize that the 
coefficient on the CON dummy variable should be negative.  MSAs under CON regulation, such 
as the Eugene-Springfield MSA, have restricted competition which should lead to a shortage in 
bed supply.   
See Table 2 for a summary of the descriptive statistics. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Hospital Variables 
Variables Number of Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Dependent Variable 
     Hospital Beds 232 1682.823 1891.007 126 12617 
Regressors (in 1,000s) 
     Total population  232 461.879 641.453 57.813 5819.100 
     Total population 65+ 232 56.800 71.055 7.662 459.992 
     Childbearing age females 232 100.017 128.555 11.852 1000.189 
     Population covered by    
          insurance 232 388.925 551.353 45.672 5237.190 
 
 
4. Data Collection
 
We collect data according to Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) as defined by the U.S. 
Census Bureau for the year 2000.13  A MSA, according the Census Bureau, is a “core area 
containing a substantial population nucleus, together with adjacent communities having a high 
degree of social and economic integration with that core.”14  Using MSAs allows us to assume 
that the smaller communities lying outside city boundaries have access to the nursing homes and 
                                                   
13 Definitions for the MSAs may be found online at http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/metro-
city/99mfips.txt. 
14 http://www.census.gov/population/www/estimates/metroarea.html 
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hospitals located within the city or surrounding areas.  It is important to note that some areas are 
listed as Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas (CMSA).  These areas contain several 
Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas (PMSA) which are more specific than the CMSAs.  
Consequently, we include the PMSAs and exclude the broader CMSAs; this enables greater 
precision. 
4.1. Nursing Homes 
 For the nursing home model, we need to collect number of nursing home beds (our 
dependent variable) and demographic data.  The Medicare website provides the number of 
nursing home beds by city and county in the year 2005.15  Using MSA definitions, we aggregate 
the number of beds in each MSA.  To gather the demographic data, we use the data (by MSA 
and PMSA) from the 2000 U.S. Census.16  From this point forward, MSAs and PMSAs will be 
jointly referred to as MSAs. 
4.2. Hospitals 
Our dependent variable in the hospital model is the number of hospital beds.  The 
American Hospital Association (AHA) database supplies the number of staffed hospital beds 
according to MSA for the year 2000. The types of hospitals included are investor-owned (for-
profit), nongovernmental not-for-profit, government (nonfederal and federal), osteopathic and 
service hospitals.   
 As in the nursing home model, we collect demographic data (by MSA) from the U.S. 
Census Bureau for the year 2000.  Since data on insurance coverage is unavailable by MSA, we 
gather state-level data from the Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) for the year 2003.17  We 
assume that a MSA has a health insurance coverage rate consistent with the state-level rate.  
 
15 The Medicare website may be found at www.medicare.gov. 
16 U.S. Census data is found at the U.S. Census Bureau website, www.census.gov. 
17 The KFF website can be found at www.statehealthfacts.org 
 
 M. Stratman and M. Spellman || Department of Economics, University of Oregon (2006)  Page 17 
 
Consequently, each MSA within a state is given the same rate as the state.  For example, the 
Eugene-Springfield, Oregon, MSA is assumed to have a rate of health insurance coverage 
consistent to that of Oregon as a whole.      
 
5. Regression Analysis 
5.1. Nursing Home Bed Analysis 
For the nursing home bed study, we show five different specifications of our model 
where with each new specification we incorporate a new variable.  This allows us to see the 
additional explanatory power for each new variable.  Our base model uses the dependent variable 
of nursing home beds and the independent variables of total population of 65 years and older in 
thousands and population of males 65 years and older in thousands.  Both variables are 
statistically significant at the 1% level and the R2 is very high at 0.9513, indicating that 95.13% 
of the variation in the number of nursing home beds is explained by these independent variables.  
The regression model states that, holding all other variables constant, for a 1,000 person increase 
in population aged 65 and older, approximately 228 more nursing home beds are needed.  
Holding population constant, for every additional 1,000 males aged 65 and older, approximately 
456 fewer nursing home beds are needed.  These findings confirm our hypotheses. 
To this base model, we add the CON law dummy variable.  The coefficients on both the 
total population and the male population are statistically significant at the 1% level and the 
coefficient on the CON law dummy variable is statistically significant at the 10% level.  The R2 
is slightly higher at 0.9516.  The coefficients on the population variables are approximately the 
same as the base model.  The model states that, holding all other variables constant, a MSA in a 
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state with CON laws is associated with approximately 215 fewer nursing home beds than a state 
without CON laws.  This finding indicates that CON laws are in fact restricting bed supply. 
To this base model, we add elderly population below the poverty level, measured in 
thousands.  The coefficient on total population increases slightly to 283 and the coefficient on 
male population decreases by approximately 100 to -565.  Both coefficients remain significant at 
the 1% level.  The coefficient on CON decreases slightly to -265 but increases in significance to 
the 5% level.  The coefficient on poverty level is also significant at the 5%.  It indicates that, 
holding all else constant, for a 1,000 person increase in elderly below the poverty level 99 fewer 
nursing home beds are needed. 
We next add the population 65 years and older with a self-care or go-outside-of-home 
disability, measured in thousands.  The coefficient on total population decreases slightly to 276 
and the coefficient on male population remains approximately the same.  Both coefficients 
remain statistically significant at the 1% level.  The coefficient on the CON law variable 
increases to -283 and remains statistically significant at the 5% level.  Neither of the coefficients 
on poverty nor disability is statistically significant. 
Finally, we add the total population 65 years and older that has some college education 
and higher (in thousands).  The coefficient on total population now increases slightly to 285 and 
the coefficient on males decreases to -592.  Both remain statistically significant at the 1% level.  
The coefficient on CON is approximately the same and remains significant at the 5% level.  The 
coefficients on the poverty, disability and education variables are statistically insignificant.  See 
Table 3 for regression results. 
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      Table 3: Nursing Home Bed Regression Results 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Base Model Base Model 
with CON 
Model (2) add 
Poverty Level 
Model (3) add 
Disability 
Model (4) add 
College 
Model (5) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Population 65+ per 
1,000 
228.818*** 
(29.240) 
228.424*** 
(29.416) 
282.730*** 
(44.287) 
275.876*** 
(40.701) 
284.517*** 
(41.418) 
254.627*** 
(55.758) 
Males 65+ per 
1,000 
-456.28*** 
(69.288) 
-455.145*** 
(69.726) 
-565.278*** 
(96.307) 
-563.788*** 
(91.789) 
-591.855*** 
(101.193) 
-497.182*** 
(124.072) 
CON 1=yes  -214.8397* 
(127.026) 
-265.400** 
(133.772) 
-283.001** 
(126.274) 
-285.208** 
(121.122) 
 
65+ Below Poverty 
Level per 1,000 
  -98.898** 
(45.627) 
-132.891 
(85.570) 
-124.816 
(89.417) 
-88.899* 
(49.681) 
65+ Disability per 
1,000 
   31.586 
(50.690) 
26.833 
(53.961) 
 
65+ some college 
per 1,000 
    9.343 
(26.434) 
 
State fixed effect 
dummy 
No No No No No Yes 
R-squared 0.9513 0.9516 0.9560 0.9563 0.9564 0.9662 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, with ***, ** and * denoting statistical significance (two-tailed 
test) at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
We also try including the female widow variable but notice its addition greatly increases 
the standard errors of the other variables.  We speculate this is due to high multicollinearity with 
the total population variable.  By running a pairwise correlation test, we discover that there is a 
collinearity of 0.9965 between the widow and total population variables.  Consequently, we 
remove the widow variable from our regressions to avoid multicollinearity. 
Based on the coefficients’ high levels of statistical significance and the high R2 of our 
third regression, we decide the variables that best estimate needed capacity of nursing home beds 
are the total elderly population, the number of elderly males, whether there are CON laws and 
elderly population below the poverty level.  To determine the needed capacity in a MSA, our 
regression equation is:  
nhbeds = 282.730 totalpop65 – 565.278 male65 – 265.400 CON – 98.898 poverty + 369.196 
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5.2. Hospital Bed Analysis 
Replicating the process used in the nursing home model, the hospital bed model to 
determine needed bed capacity begins with a base model and additional models are formulated in 
order to gauge the interaction of the variables in each subsequent regression.  The base model 
uses the total number of staffed beds as the dependent variable and total population as the 
explanatory variable.  Total population is found statistically significant at the 1% level and R2 is 
0.8320; this indicates that 83.20% of the variation in the number of hospital beds is explained by 
the independent variable. It is important to note that this R2 is relatively high considering only 
one explanatory variable is included in the model. To simplify interpretation, the independent 
variable is divided by 1,000 to create a coefficient that represents the effect of a 1,000-person 
change in the population in a MSA has on the number of hospital beds needed.  The regression 
model indicates that, holding all other variables constant, for a 1,000 person increase in total 
population, approximately 2.7 more hospital beds are needed. This positive influence of total 
population reflects our hypotheses. 
To this base model, we add the total population of persons 65 and over in thousands. The 
coefficients on both total population and total population 65 and older are statistically significant 
at the 1% level and positive, as we hypothesized.  The coefficient on total population remains 
positive, indicating the addition of elderly population is justified.  The model indicates that, 
holding total population constant, for every additional 1,000 persons 65 and older, approximately 
13 more hospital beds are needed.   
 
 
 
  Table 4: Hospital Bed Regression Results 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, with ***, ** and * denoting statistical significance (two-tailed test) at 
the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Base 
Model 
Base Model 
with Population 
over 65 
Model (2) add 
Females Child 
Bearing Age 
Model (2) add 
Population 
Insured 
Model (2) 
add CON 
Model (2) add 
State Fixed 
Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total Population 
per 1,000 
2.713***     
(0.255) 
1.372*** 
(0.337) 
0.401 
(0.295) 
1.903  
(3.340) 
1.371*** 
(0.335) 
1.237*** 
(0.313) 
Population 65+ 
per 1,000 
 13.169*** 
(3.152) 
12.391*** 
(2.937) 
13.015***    
(2.721) 
13.207*** 
(3.139) 
15.551*** 
(3.268) 
Females of Child 
Bearing Age per 
1,000 
  5.420*** 
(1.685) 
   
Population 
covered by 
health insurance 
per 1,000 
   -.602 
(2.967) 
  
CON 1 = Yes     -58.440 
(99.629) 
 
State Fixed 
Effects 
No No No No No Yes 
R-squared 0.8320 0.8705 0.8781 0.8706 0.8707 0.9154 
 
The third variable we add to the model is the total population of childbearing age (15 to 
44 years old) females.  The coefficient on this variable is highly statistically significant at the 1% 
level; however, the coefficient on total population becomes statistically insignificant.  That the 
total population variable becomes insignificant after including childbearing age females indicates 
that population levels of childbearing age females may not vary enough state to state to be a 
significant factor. With that said, we stay consistent with literature that suggests this 
demographic does influence the number of hospital beds needed in an area but is instead 
captured within the total population variable.   
In our next model, we include the number of persons covered by health insurance (either 
employer-provided, individual, Medicaid, Medicare or other), measured in thousands, and omit 
childbearing age females.  The coefficients on both health insurance coverage and total 
population are statistically insignificant; the population over 65 remains statistically significant 
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at the 1% level. Similar to the childbearing age variable, this result suggests that insurance levels 
may not vary enough by state to be a significant factor in the model.   
In our final model, we include total population, total elderly population and the CON 
dummy variable.  The coefficients on total population and elderly population are very close to 
what they are in the second model (which includes only those two variables) and remain 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  The coefficient on the CON dummy variable is 
statistically insignificant.  Thus, the model indicates that the CON laws do not distort the market; 
that is, the state's criteria accurately determines the number of beds that would be needed in a 
competitive market.  See Table 4 for regression results. 
Based on the statistical significance of the coefficients of the second model (which 
includes total population and total population of persons 65 and older), we determine this model 
is most representative of needed capacity for staffed hospital beds in a MSA.  Our regression 
equation is: 
Hospital beds = 1.372 totpop + 13.169 pop65over + 309.189 
 
6. Applying Regressions 
6.1. Nursing Homes 
In the previous section, we ran several regressions using nursing home beds as our 
dependent variable.  We selected the model that best estimates needed capacity of beds and will 
now apply that regression to several MSAs to determine whether they are at, below or above 
needed capacity. 
Recall that our final regression included total elderly population, total elderly male 
population, the presence of CON and elderly population below the poverty level.  The equation 
is: nhbeds = 282.730 totalpop65 – 565.278 male65 – 265.400 CON – 98.898 poverty + 369.196. 
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Table 5: Nursing home bed MSA-specific data, estimations and comparisons 
MSA Total Pop 65+ 
Male 
Pop 65+ 
Presence of 
CON 1=yes 
65+ Below 
Poverty Level 
Estimated # 
of Beds 
Actual # 
of Beds 
Difference:  
Actual – 
Estimated 
Eugene-
Springfield OR 42,954 18,140 1 3,149 1,683 1,229 – 454 
Medford-
Ashland OR 28,991 12,635 1 1,944 966 596 – 370 
Spokane WA 51,949 21,198 1 4,021 2428 3,686 + 1258 
Albuquerque 
NM 80,421 33,995 0 7,213 3177 2,302 – 875 
 
 To estimate needed capacity, we insert a MSA’s data into the above equation.  We will 
estimate needed capacity in the following MSAs: Eugene-Springfield, OR; Medford-Ashland, 
OR; Spokane, WA; and Albuquerque, NM.  The Oregon MSAs will help show if there are 
similarities within the state; the Washington MSA will allow a comparison between the two 
northwestern states; and New Mexico does not have CON regulations.  Table 5 shows the data 
used for each MSA, the estimated number of beds and the actual number of beds. 
As Table 5 shows, Eugene-Springfield, Medford-Ashland and Albuquerque are all under 
needed capacity while Spokane is above needed capacity.  Chart 1 provides a visual of the 
difference between estimated and actual numbers of beds in these MSAs.  Specifically, our 
regression estimates that, based on its demographic characteristics, the Eugene-Springfield MSA 
needs approximately 454 more beds than it currently has.  It is important to note that although 
the Eugene-Springfield MSA includes the entirety of Lane County, it is reasonable to assume the 
majority of nursing home bed demand lies within the Eugene-Springfield area. 
 
 
 
 
Chart 1: Graph of actual and estimated number of nursing home beds 
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6.2. Hospitals 
For our hospital bed model, we use our final regression equation to determine the needed 
capacity of hospital beds in Eugene-Springfield. The final regression equation includes total 
population and total elderly population: Hospital beds = 1.372 totpop + 13.169 pop65over + 309.189. 
Again, for comparison purposes, we apply the model to another MSA in Oregon 
(Medford-Ashland), a MSA in another state with CON regulations (Spokane, WA), and a MSA 
in a state without CON regulations (Albuquerque, NM). The results are presented in Table 6. 
The regression estimates that the Eugene-Springfield MSA needs approximately 1318 
staffed hospital beds, based on its characteristics.  With a current total of 586 beds, the model 
suggests the area needs approximately 732 additional staffed hospital beds.  Again assuming 
Eugene-Springfield’s predominance of Lane County, the majority of this need should lie within 
the Eugene-Springfield area. 
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Table 6: Hospital bed MSA-specific data, estimations and comparisons 
MSA Total Pop Total Pop over 65 
Estimated # 
of Beds 
Actual # of 
Beds 
Difference: 
Actual – Estimated 
Eugene-Springfield 322,959 42,954 1,318 586 -732 
Medford-Ashland 181,269 28,991 940 384 -556 
Spokane, WA 417,939 51,949 1,567 1,625 +58 
Albuquerque, NM 712,738 80,421 2,346 1,970 -376 
 
We again see in Table 6, consistent with the nursing home regression, that Eugene-
Springfield, Medford-Ashland and Albuquerque are below needed capacity and Spokane is 
above needed capacity.  Chart 2 provides a visual of the difference between estimated and actual 
numbers of beds in these MSAs.   
 
 
Chart 2: Graph of actual and estimated number of hospital beds 
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7. Alternative Specifications 
7.1. Log-Log Model 
 Our nursing home and hospital bed models use linear functional forms to estimate needed 
capacity.  We want to see whether log-log functional forms would provide better estimates since 
a log-log model normalizes everything into percent changes.  Using our selected nursing home 
bed model (total elderly population, elderly males, presence of CON and elderly below poverty 
level), we run another regression in log-log form.  The regression equation is:  
ln(nhbeds) = 6.097 ln(totalpop65) – 5.02 ln(male65) – 0.165 ln(CON) – 0.158 ln(poverty) – 6.934. 
The signs on each coefficient are the same as the linear model; the coefficient on the poverty 
level variable is statistically significant at the 5% level and the remaining coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  In addition, the needed capacity estimates are very similar to the 
estimates from our linear regression.  For example, the log-log model estimates the Eugene-
Springfield MSA needs 1689 beds; the linear model estimates 1683 beds.   
Next, we convert our linear model for hospital beds to a log-log functional form.  The 
regression equation is:  
ln(hospital beds) = 0.817 ln(totpop) + 0.0512 ln(pop65over) + 2.208. 
The coefficient for population over 65 is less statistically significant, now at the 10% 
level.  Nevertheless, if we are to look at the predictions, they are consistent with the linear 
model; the Eugene-Springfield, Medford-Ashland and Albuquerque MSAs are all under capacity 
while the Spokane MSA stays above.  
The log-log models provide estimations consistent with the linear models; this indicates 
that our linear models can be seen as the correct specifications to be used. 
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7.2. State Fixed Effects  
We return to our linear regression models and investigate state fixed effects.  The 
regression model applied in Section 6. compares a specific MSA to MSAs across the nation.  
Now we want to determine whether there is a fixed effect that occurs in an individual state.  In 
other words, we will now control for each state’s fixed effect.  Specifically, we will control for 
Oregon’s fixed effect—whether there are factors in Oregon that impact needed nursing home  
and hospital bed capacity. 
 To control for state fixed effects, we create a dummy variable for each MSA in every 
state.  The dummy variable takes the value of 1 if we are investigating that particular state’s 
fixed effects.  For example, when looking at Oregon’s state fixed effects, the fixed effect dummy 
variable takes the value of 1 for all the MSAs in Oregon and a value of 0 for the MSAs in the 
remaining states.18   
For nursing homes, we run a regression including the state fixed effects dummy variable, 
elderly population, elderly males and elderly below the poverty level.  We exclude the CON 
dummy variable because this effect is captured by the state fixed effects dummy variable.  See 
Column (6) in Table 3 for the regression results.  All of the coefficients are statistically 
significant and the R2 is very high at 0.9662.  The coefficient on the Oregon fixed effects dummy 
variable is -866 and is statistically significant at the 10% level.  This indicates that the MSAs in 
Oregon are below capacity for nursing home beds, relative to MSAs in other states.   
As for hospitals, we run a regression including the state fixed effects dummy variable, 
total population and elderly population. Similar to the nursing home model, both of the 
explanatory coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level and the R2 is high at 0.9154.  
 
18 Some MSAs cross state boundaries.  These MSAs are assigned to the state in which the majority of nursing home 
beds are located.  See Appendix 1 for a list of all applicable MSAs and their assigned state. 
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The coefficient on the Oregon fixed effects dummy variable is approximately -532 and is 
statistically significant at the 1% level, once again indicating that all MSAs in Oregon are below 
capacity for hospital bed, relative to MSAs in other states. See Column (6) in Table 4 for the 
regression results. 
 There are several factors that may cause Oregon to have lower needed capacity: the 
influence and/or strength of CON regulations relative to other states; preferences of its residents 
(for example, preferring home-based care rather than nursing home care); or other characteristics 
unique to Oregon. 
 Using this regression with Oregon’s fixed effects, we estimate needed nursing home bed 
capacity in Eugene-Springfield to be 736 beds, which indicates an excess of 493 beds.  This 
shows that after controlling for Oregon’s fixed effects, Eugene-Springfield is not under capacity 
when compared to other Oregon MSAs.  Conversely, the estimate of needed hospital bed 
capacity in the MSA is 681 beds, still indicating an undersupply of 95 beds. We conclude that for 
hospital beds, after controlling for Oregon’s fixed effects, Eugene-Springfield is slightly under 
capacity compared to other Oregon MSAs. 
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8. Conclusion
 Our study shows that the Eugene-Springfield area needs increased capacity in both 
nursing home and hospital beds.  These results show there is excess demand not currently met by 
hospital bed supply, indicating there should be no concern over the planned hospital expansions.  
These regressions that control for demographic, socioeconomic and CON regulation 
characteristics are important to ensure that the supply of beds meets the demand.  It is 
particularly important to carefully monitor supply in states with CON regulations.  Our 
regression results indicate that the CON regulations constrict the supply of nursing home beds 
below market demand.  However, CON regulations for hospital beds appear to accurately supply 
the demanded number of beds.  The growth of the American population, in particular the elderly, 
emphasizes the need for adequate supply of nursing home and hospital beds.  Studies such as this 
are important tools for policy-makers to use when determining needed supply of health care. 
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Appendix A.
 
Some Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) cross state boundaries.  In order to gauge the effect 
of CON regulations or state fixed effects, we assign these MSAs to the state in which the 
majority of the MSA’s beds are located.  The following chart lists the affected MSAs and their 
assigned unique state: 
 
 
MSA code Assigned state 
0600 Georgia 
1520 North Carolina 
1560 Tennessee 
1640 Ohio 
1660 Kentucky 
1800 Georgia 
1900 Maryland 
1960 Illinois 
2440 Indiana 
2520 North Dakota 
2720 Arkansas 
2985 Minnesota 
3760 Missouri 
4120 Nevada 
4160 Massachusetts 
4520 Kentucky 
4920 Tennessee 
5120 Minnesota 
5920 Nebraska 
6160 Pennsylvania 
6440 Oregon 
6450 New Hampshire 
6480 Rhode Island 
7040 Missouri 
8360 Texas 
 
 
